Since the beginning of the invasion, Russians have kept repeating that they had destroyed the Ukrainian air force. In fact, they had claimed on the first day of invasion that UAF had been destroyed. In March 2022., Russian Ministry of Defense again claimed that all Ukrainian aircraft had been destroyed or disabled, and repeated the claim yet again in June. Yet Ukrainian Su-27s bombed Snake Island in May, and Ukrainian Su-27s have been spotted over Donbass in mid-August. During August, Ukrainian MiG-29s had been filmed firing HARM. Russian Defense Ministry claimed to have shot down two Su-25s over Zaporizhzia on August 29. Like Lazarus, Ukrainian air force has risen from the dead time and again, zombified aircraft taking off to haunt the Russians.
Or have they? Rather than Ukrainians using witchcraft to raise their pilots and aircraft from the dead, more likely is that the Ukrainian air force had never been destroyed in the first place. And this has some important lessons for the future.
Before continuing however, I have to note that official kill claims โ as so ofteen seen through history โ are complete bullshit. If official kill claims were correct, Russians will have destroyed the entire Ukrainian Air Force at least twice over, whereas Russian Air Force would be fielding museum MiG-15s instead of Su-35s. This is simply a product of confusion and fog of war. If fighter shoots a missile at a target and target disappears from the radar, logical assumption is that target had been destroyed โ when the most likely outcome was that the target had broken radar contact by diving to the ground and notching the missile. Attacking pilot is then likely to conclude that target had been destroyed.
List of acronyms I had used in the text is located at the end.
Strategic Lessons โ Air Denial
most of Ukraineโs ground-based air defense systems at the start of the invasion. Ukrainian outnumbered and outgunned fighter squadrons were left to defend the country on their own, and took heavy losses until the air defenses could be brought back online. Russiaโs technological and numerical advantage meant that they took essentially no losses in air-to-air combat. During those three days of grace, Russian strike craft flew hundreds of missions each day, up to 300 kilometers deep into the Ukrainian territory. These sorties were flown at medium altitude โ right in the heart of the normal air defense envelope โ and flown by day, with fighter patrols higher up. Strike sorties werenโt flown in โpackagesโ of mutually supporting aircraft, but usually in singles and pairs, which was possible precisely because Ukrainian air defenses had been suppressed. Almost no strike missions were flown in groups of more than six aircraft.
Despite these clear advantages, Russia failed in establishing air superiority over Ukraine. It has failed in terms of battlefield information gathering and electronic warfare. Initial strikes on February 24 failed at koncking out the critical C2 nodes as these were not identified and strikes not concentrated against them. Russiaโs non-kinetic attacks such as cyberattacks and electronic warfare had limited effectiveness and were poorly integrated with kinetic attacks. With the exception of the initial strikes, Russia also completely failed at suppressing the Ukrainian air defense, failing to destroy enough SAMs or aircraft on the ground. Fixed air defense positions have been destroyed, but mobile SAMs and MANPADS systems proved extremely resillient. While temporary suppression has been achieved, it was limited to first three days of the invasion as there had been no concentrated, prolonged SEAD effort. Russians also failed at properly processing and integrating intelligence, such as locating SAMโs and aircraft dispersal points, and had no plans to countering Ukrainian UAVs.
One major flaw in Russian aircraft performance was lack of higher quality technology โ sensors and computers โ which has impacted their ability to maintain battlefield awareness, gather intelligence, and perform in the electronic warfare and supression of enemy air defences. Situational awareness and datalink capability are inferior to NATO standard. This makes them more vulnerable to pop-up threats such as SAMs and MANPADS, as well as less able to carry out a successful strike. Even Russian dedicated reconnaissance aircraft (Su-24MR) are essentially Cold War technology.
Russians also lack dedicated SEAD squadrons to suppress SAMs. While Russian fighters do have jamming pods and anti-radiation missiles, there is no substitute for specialist training which SEAD crews receive. Pilots trained for multiple roles are simply not able to handle the mission, and Russian Air Force does not even have enough of these. Russia also lacks dedicated SEAD aircraft capable of geolocation and destruction of enemy air defenses. Neither are Russians flying SEAD missions systematically as a part of the coordinated effort to degrade Ukrainian air defenses. They lack the dedicated aircraft and targeting systems for the role, and munitions used for SEAD are limited to anti-radiation missiles. This has sharply limited Russian effectiveness against Ukrainian air defenses, and consequently the number of combat sorties Russian Air Force was able to fly in total.
Electronic warfare was also poorly integrated into SEAD efforts. This was especially important because the aforementioned lack of SEAD units meant that Russian Air Force was reliant on the electronic warfare capabilities to paralyze the enemy. While this is in fact how Soviet and later Russian air force was intended to operate, even Russian electronic warfare capability has shown itself lacking. But Russian Air Force failed to coordinate or even deconflict its electronic warfare capabilities, which meant that the aircraft ended up jamming each other during the first phase of the operation, though problems have since been fixed. But these flaws allowed Ukrainians time to adapt and disperse their air force and ground defences alike.
Serbian SA-6 systems survived the war. And during the Gulf War in 1991., Coalition forces have failed to kill a single SCUD. West too has failed at integrating cyber warfare on tactical level, keeping it entirely on the strategic level. All of this means that air denial is relatively easy to achieve.
Ukrainians have employed precisely this, despite the fact that many of their air defense systems date back to the Soviet era. Deploying mobile S-300, SA-11 and SA-8 SAM systems, Ukrainians have used โshoot and scootโ tactics, utilizing mobility and dispersion to maintain their air defenses as an active threat. This has led to an essentially โcat-and-mouseโ game between the Russian aircraft and Ukrainian air defenses. Oryx has estimated that Russia had lost 66 combat aircraft, of which 11 Su-30 and 1 Su-35 โ both equivalents to the US F-15. In exchange, Russia has knocked out only 24 out of 250 S-300 launchers in 11 weeks. This in fact supports American experiences against mobile SAMs. On Russian side, anti-radiation missiles have proven likely the most effective weapon against the SAM installations, but their effectiveness too has been limited, at least in terms of hard kills.
Part of the reason is usage of long-range air control radars (as well as NATO AWACS) for tracking Russian aircraft. This means that Ukrainian SAM batteries only need to turn on their radars for the final engagement stage.
Ukraine is also receiving replacement S-300 SAM systems from former Warsaw Pact countries such as Slovakia. This support is in fact crucial because, despite everything noted above, other estimates do state that Ukraine has been losing several S-300 launchers every week. Cause of the losses are mostly artillery and Orlan-10 UAVs.
But Ukrainian strategy was more than just SAMs. Ukrainian air defences are layered, combining conventional air defense systems, electromagnetic jamming, drones and missiles. This, combined with dispersion and mobility, suggests that any future SEAD/DEAD campaign may be even more difficult than the Western analysts believe. In fact, conventional suppression may soon become impractical, necessitating usage of artillery for SEAD and thus limiting air forces to a role much akin to that in the First World War. While some breathing room can be gained through usage of โstealthโ aircraft, this is of questionable long-term utility in face of rapidly developing sensors, and also faces some fundamental challenges discussed later.
Second lesson however was that conventional aircraft can in fact operate in nonpermissive environment โ stealth fighters are not required to penetrate IADS, even if they may make the job much easier. Russian SA-21 / S-400 system has failed to deny Ukrainian Air Force the ability to operate โ just as Ukrainian air defenses have failed to deny the same to Russian aircraft. Fighter aircraft are necessary to establish control over the air โ air defences can only deny control to the enemy, but not establish it or prevent enemy from operating in their presence. As a result, airspace over Ukraine has remained highly contested. It should be noted however that MANPADS in particular have shown themselves to also be a major threat to their own side โ they donโt have IFF interrogation capability, so if a soldier misidentifies an aircraft, there missile goes. (EDIT 29.1.: I was informed that at least US Stinger does have IFF capability).
Nevertheless, due to their inability to conclusively destroy Ukrainian air defense, Russian aircraft have shifted from SEAD and CAS missions to traditional strikes against fixed installations and air superiority after the first week of combat. Perhaps the most important Russian asset in these strikes are long-range strategic bombers equipped with cruise missiles. These have consistently performed well in taking out strategic targets, and have in fact performed majority of Russian cruise missile strikes. Ukrainians meanwhile had decentralized their IADS into tactical groups, giving each group a zone to control.
This also means that the only way to reliably protect an installation is to make it mobile. Fixed installations have to be protected by heavy air defenses, but these cannot intercept all the drones and missiles. Unmanned vehicles, loitering munitions and cruise missiles may be used to destroy enemy air capability on the ground. Therefore, any fighter aircraft used in any sort of a serious conventional war must have the capability to operate from dispersed air fields, be it highways or dirt strips, and be easy to maintain. In short, fewer F-22s and F-35s, and more Gripens and MiG-21s.
And fighters have to be ready to react at momentโs notice, which again means that they have to be easy to maintain and easy to conceal. When not on standby for point or area defense, fighter jets are carrying out the combat air patrol. The pace of operations is grueling. Ukrainian MiG-29s sometimes fly two sorties per day, and usually one per day, and everything is done to get them into the air and into the fight as quickly as possible. Yet the fact that they are difficult to maintain rather limits MiG-29s capabilities in this area.
Greatest threat to Ukrainian aircraft are logistics. Their old Su-27s and MiG-29s require spare parts to fly. Surplus supplies provided by other Eastern European states are not unlimited, and once these dry up, Ukraine may not be able to keep its aircraft in the air. But if Ukraine is given the wrong gear, it may lose the aircraft anyway. Any aircraft incapable of operating from road bases may not be able to survive for long, as seen from the next section. And if Ukraine receives new Western aircraft, it may end up losing them all in a foolhardy attempt at establishing air superiority โ something Russian Air Force had already failed to do. As already noted, Russian inability to decisively win the air war is not due to their own incompetence, but rather due to a fundamental shift from offense to defense โ in some ways, modern warfare has more in common with the First World War than anything that came after it.
Overall, both Ukrainian and Russian air defences have worked precisely as advertised. Both sides ended up denying the other ability to effectively operate in air offensive operations. Ukrainian success in the air defense has forced the Russians to switch almost entirely to a strategic bombardment campaign aimed at destruction of Ukraineโs economy. Russian satellites are able to give them data for Ukrainian infrastructure โ factories, grain silos, oil tanks โ which can then be hit by air-deployed cruise missiles. This capability is something Ukraine has so far been unable to counter. How effective it will be is unclear. Strategic bombardment campaign has never won a war on its own. Wars have always been won on the ground โ Japan may have capitulated after two atomic bombs, but fact often forgotten is that its navy has been completely obliterated by the US Navy, and the Red Army had eliminated Japanese forces in Manchuria and Korea. German Blitz completely failed to bring United Kingdom to the negotiating table. And Allied strategic bombardment campaign served to make life of troops on the ground easier, but war was still won by ground offensive. In short, unless Russia can actually win the ground campaign, strategic bombardment campaign will not win the war for them.
Air denial was also a key to Ukrainian war effort. By denying Russia the air presence, Ukraine denied it the ability to ascertain Ukrainian troop dispositions as well as support its own troops during Ukrainian counteroffensives. Russian attempts to compensate for the lack of manned ISR presence by using satellites and drones were not effective. Russian satellites lack the resolution to detect groundside troop movements, while UAVs are highly vulnerable to air defenses. Air denial also forced Russian transport aircraft to take the longer route. Lastly, it has protected Ukrainian ground forces when transiting or maneuvering โ which is precisely when they are the most vulnerable to air attack.
Strategic Lessons โ Aircraft on the Ground
Looking at Wikipedia list of losses, I decided to count destroyed aircraft. Results are below.
Ukrainian (Wikipedia, 21.1.2023.):
Russian (Wikipedia, 21.1.2023.):
As it can be seen, ground attack missions are by far the most dangerous. Yet despite the Russian Air Force being on the offensive, its losses are much lower than Ukrainian losses โ either in combat or on the ground.
It should also be kept in mind that Ukraine utilized road basing and dirt strips to preserve their aircraft while on the ground. Most groundside losses had in fact happened during opening days of the war before Ukrainians had had the time to disperse their aircraft to road bases and backup air fields โ Ukraine had lost six of its 30 MiG-29s in a single attack, and almost no losses on the ground had happened after 27 February. It is entirely likely that Western air forces would have suffered far more extensive losses on the ground. In fact, Ukrainian usage of Russian aircraft was a major advantage precisely because of their ability to use rough fields and half-fallen-apart airstrips, and their STOL capability giving them ability to operate from highways as well.
Currently, Ukrainian aircraft and crews operate from ad-hoc secret bases established after the war has begun. These can be old dispersal air fields as well as aircraft shelters constructed near highways and other roads, with fighter jets taking off those same roads. This is the only way for them to survive the threat of Russian missile strikes that had been so devastating in the opening days of the war. And Ukraine was aware of this problem. Ukrainian Air Force had been training in operating from dispersed road bases since at least the 2014. Crimean War.
This dispersal training and ability has paid off. Despite pre-war predictions of swift Russian victory, Russians have failed to eliminate the Ukrainian Air Force and achieve air superiority over Ukraine. As already noted, it is not only ground-based air defenses that are keeping Ukraine in the air fight, but fighter aircraft as well. Ability to disperse their air power and operate fighter aircraft from basically anywhere has, more than anything else besides ground-based air defences, allowed the Ukrainian Air Force to stay in the fight and keep contesting control of the skies.
Had Ukrainian air force operated from fixed air bases like NATO tends to do, it would have quickly fallen victim to very effective cruise and ballistic missile strikes and rendered a non-factor in short order. This is something NATO countries have to consider in any potential confrontation with a major opponent โ be it Russia, China or whoever. And road or dirt strip operations are far more complex question than just ability of aircraft to take off from a certain surface. It is a matter of doctrine, training, aircraft design and logistical footprint. While hardened aircraft shelters are another option, they lack the flexibility of road basing and may be targeted for destruction. A mix of both road basing and air base hardening is likely the best choice.
Strategic Lessons โ Logistics
pilots in German Luftwaffe were able to meet NATO minimum requirement of 180 hours per year. French Rafale pilots had an average of 162 hours flown in 2022., and this is expected to fall to 147 hours in 2023 due to delivery of Rafale jets to Croatia which are to begin in 2024 (why Croatia needs Rafales is a mystery). In Croatian Air Force, some pilots fly less than 30 hours per year. In short, many of the flaws that have hampered the Russian Air Force also exist in air forces of the NATO allies. Fact is also that with the exception of USAF, most and perhaps all NATO air forces are also too small to carry out their role. For comparison, Chinese pilots fly 150 hours per year.
Western air forces are also heavily reliant on precision munitions. Yet these can be expended quickly. Russia may be about to run out of precision munitions for its aircraft. Again, this is nothing unique to Russia โ during its 2011. campaign in Libya, against an opponent far less difficult than Ukraine, NATOโs European members began to run low on some precision guided munitions very early into the campaign. It is thus clear that if one is expected to rely heavily on PGM employment, there is a need to build up extensive stocks of munitions during the peacetime, as wartime production simply may not meet the demand.
Limited supply of PGMs has exacerbated the already mentioned lack of training and lack of experience in using precision munitions. While Russia does have laser- and GLONASS- (GPS) -guided minitions, their use in Ukraine has been sporadic. Majority of weapons used by Russia were unguided weapons, such as โdumbโ bombs. This has limited the effectiveness of Russian SEAD as air defense emplacements are difficult to hit with such unguided weapons, unless from extremely low altitude.
Necessity of Interservice Cooperation
Russian communication and interservice cooperation has been abysmal. Only the attached helicopter units have been able to successfully work with ground troops on a regular basis, and they too have many technical issues. This is actually a good argument for integrating air forces back into the armies.
Russiaโs rather abysmal performance should be seen as a cautionary tale. This is especially true since NATO coutries have largely replaced artillery with air force and completely removed the territorial defense units, conscription and other means of providing for large wartime military. For the West, if one does not have an air force, he cannot have a joint force. This makes Western militaries as a whole, and air forces in particular, incapable of fighting a high-intensity attritional war that would be required against a modern opponent and which both Ukraine and Russia have been fighting since February. Western militaries, lacking in massed artillery, armor and mechanized infantry, depend on having air superiority. They are simply not able to fight properly in conditions where air superiority is negated, as seen currently for both sides in Ukraine.
Tactical Lessons โ Ground Support
Above situation has had implications to ground support. Aircraft on both sides have employed one of two approaches: either operating at high altitudes, or flying extremely low. It is essentially a rule of hundreds: anything below 10 000 and above 100 feet is a kill zone. To provide close air support relatively safely, one needs to operate outside that band: that is, either above 10 000 or below 100 feet. Even up to 1 000 feet above the ground still provides a decent level of safety from radar-based surface-to-air missiles.
Aircraft flying low however are very vulnerable to anti-aircraft artillery and MANPADS. Air defence troops can lay down ambushes utilizing their superior knowledge of the terrain. But because Russians are invading, they do not have that. As a result, Ukrainian aircraft have regularly flown fast and low on their missions. They did this without night vision or GPS, through terrain full of obstacles.
Despite the dangers, low-level operations have been frequent, and possibly even the norm for both sides. Even air combat frequently happened at low altitude, which may have helped to establish the legend of the โGhost of Kyivโ. Interestingly however, the table seen previously may indicate that the small, cheap and simple L-39 is one of more survivable CAS platforms despite lacking basically all bells and whistles (such as guided munitions) of modern aircraft. It just comes in, drops some very dumb bombs on enemy heads, and leaves while providing firework of flares and chaff. Of course, without knowing number of sorties flown, this is just baseless speculation. According to Oryx however, Su-25 is the aircraft that had suffered the most casualties in the war.
But their greatest impact was as a forward artillery control aircraft: in an environment where artillery rules the battlefield, information provided to artillery units can decide a battle. UAVs had been used to both spot the targets for artillery, and spot the enemy artillery for counterbattery fire. With UAV presence, artillery response time can be as low as three minutes. Still, they cannot replace traditional air power. Compared to manned aircraft, most UAVs being used in Ukraine are range- and payload- -limited, slow, and have limited endurance. As such, they are very limited in what they can do.
Unmanned vehicles are essentially either expendable missiles or missile baits, often being used to bait ground-based defences into turning on their radars and thus making them vulnerable to attacks by fighters carrying anti-radiation missiles. In other words, for drones to be useful, one needs to first establish air superiority. Even with airspace contested, attrition of drones has been so high that it has limited both their availability and their operational utility. Due to general issues with drone employment, and especially attrition due to combat losses, actual utility of all types of drones has been sharply limited. Traditional manned air power is thus absolutely crucial.
Russian Close Air Support had been deficient. Lack of real-time targeting information due to few or no forward air controllers embedded within the ground forces means that Russian aircraft are basically fighting blind. This problem is made even worse by the fact that Russian aircraft lack good targeting pods that could use FLIR to identify targets. Su-25 cannot mount pods at all, and while Su-24 and Su-30 can carry targeting pods, there are too few available. Only Su-34 is capable of doing this, but its inbuilt systems are lacking in performance and are compromised by humid weather and rain โ which in Ukraine is frequent. Su-34 generally lacks an IR channel, making it incapable of providing air support in bad weather or during the night. In fact, most Russian ground attack planes never were intended to provide close air support capability, and instead were intended for use against fixed targets. They have little capability to search for mobile targets on the battlefield, and Russian response time is generally around a day. Instead, artillery is the support weapon of choice.
ability to hit targets smaller and more mobile than buildings. Bombardment has thus switched to attacks against cities, which are not very effective.
Shift to Donbass did allow them to start operating at higher altitudes. Russians generally do not cross over to Ukrainian side, but use ground attack aircraft, helicopters and standoff munitions to attack frontline targets from medium and low altitude.
Russian UAVs however had proved effective at SEAD and DEAD. They fly in groups of three. One will carry EW suite and fly above the range of MANPADS, above 5 000 to 6 000 meters, and bait the radar-based air defences to unmask themselves as they cannot know what payload it is carrying and if it is spotting for artillery. If the latter is true, then UAV has to be shot down. But when SAMs attempt to shoot it down, electronic warfare suite generally jams the missiles. At the same time the second UAV with ELINT payload starts geolocating the SAMs radar site. Once it does, the third UAV carrying optical payload will fix it and guide in either loitering munitions, artillery shells or guided missiles. All of this has successfully forced Ukrainian SAMs further back from the frontline, allowing Russian aircraft to move in closer. Many SAM systems had also been lost.
Tactical Lessons โ Air Combat
Ukrainian air defenses have largely forced Russian fighter aircraft to operate in their own territory, where distance provides some protection from ground-to-air missile fire. Yet despite it, Russian fighters have remained effective thanks to the long range R-77 and R-37 missiles. These allowed them to engage in air combat while staying outside the range of Ukrainian air defenses. Against Ukrainian fighters, their main advantage in air combat is usage of fire-and-forget missiles. Ukrainian Su-27s and MiG-29s are old Soviet models which lack most of the capabilities of newer models or upgraded old aircraft. The main beyond-visual-range missile Ukrainian fighters use is semi-active radar targeting R-27ER, which requires the aircraft to keep the nose pointed at the enemy to keep him lit for the missile. This means they cannot turn away or turn off their radar unless they want to use infrared-seeker R-27ER which has half the range of its radar-based counterpart. As a result, BVR engagement requires them to fly straight into the enemy air-to-air missiles, as well as into the teeth of Russian ground-based air defences. By the time R-27ET has reached its target โ hit or miss โ the launching fighter will have closed from 60 miles to 45 miles, while flying straight and level the whole time. Active radar is equivalent to a flashlight in a dark room: you can see what you are illuminating, but everyone can see you. And since Ukrainian radar does not have track-while-scan capability, target receives clear warning of the radar lock. Combination of a semi-active radar guidance and lack of TWS means that Ukrainian fighter aircraft attacking a target is rendered essentially blind up until the missile has reached the target. Russian fighters have active, fire-and-forget missiles which allow them to turn off radar after launching the missile. Radars onboard Russian fighters have much greater range, and thus also ability to defeat noise jamming. Their TWS ability allows them to maneuver while keeping multiple enemies targeted and to launch radar-guided missiles without warning the target of the launch. Issue is so bad that many Ukrainian pilots are using R-27ER despite its much shorter range. The only downside to track-while-scan mode is that it relies on missileโs own radar for terminal guidance, and missile radar is much easier to jam.
are able to fly higher and faster, and Russian radar is better which allows them to burn through all the interference more easily.
Effectiveness of missiles themselves is unknown. In one case of a BVR shootdown of an Ukrainian jet, two Ukrainian jets were engaging 12 Russian counterparts. Historically, beyond visual range combat has proven effective only in cases where one side had major numerical and technological advantage. Both of these factors are true here, which means that Ukraine has to rely on essentially guerilla tactics and electronic warfare. It is also unknown how many missiles it took to achieve a shootdown, but it should be noted that Ukrainians were pushing into the Russian jets, and description implies that multiple Russian jets took shots. This could mean anywhere between three (if only three Russian fighters launched a single missile each) and 96 (if Russian fighters expended their entire load) missiles launched (note that RVV-AE will have allowed Russians to carry up to 12 missiles per fighter or 144 missiles in total).
Major flaw of the Ukrainian old Su-27s and other old Soviet aircraft is that they were designed to receive information from the ground. Even with the radar turned on, the information available is limited โ which is far different from Western fighters such as F-16. On the flip side, Su-27 can be in the air in five minutes โ preflight checks on the F-15 take 20 minutes on their own. But Russian fighters have those same advantages while also having largely resolved old Soviet situational awareness issues. They also fly with wingtip pods which allow them to jam Ukrainian inter-fighter communications, thus reducing Ukrainian ability to coordinate, as well as Ukrainian radars.
Strategic Lessons โ Causes of Losses
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_aircraft_losses_during_the_Russo-Ukrainian_War
note: data from 21.1.2023.
NOTES:
- On the first day of the attack โ 24 February โ Ukraine had lost 11 aircraft on the ground and 8 in combat
- By 27 Feburary, Ukraine had lost 17 aircraft on the ground and 12 in combat.
- Most of the aircraft noted as โlost in combatโ were likely shot down by air defense.
Conclusions
Overall, the air war in Ukraine seems to point to future air war being a mixture of First and Second World War experience. Heavy SAM presence has largely restricted air activity to the frontline, which itself is largely static thanks to preponderance of guided munitions and other threats making large-scale maneuvers on the open extremely risky.
Acronyms
AAA โ anti-aircraft artillery
AdlA โ Armee de lโAir (Army of the Air, name of the French Air Force)
APU โ auxilliary power unit
AWACS โ airborne warning and control system
BVR โ beyond visual range
C2 โ command and control
C4ISR โ command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance
CAP โ combat air patrol
CAS โ close air support
DEAD โ destruction of enemy air defenses
ELINT โ electronic intelligence
EW โ electronic warfare
FLIR โ forward looking infrared
HARM โ high speed anti radiation missile
IADS โ intergated air defense system
ISR โ intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance
MANPADS โ man-portable air defense system
NATO โ North Atlantic Treaty Organization
PGM โ precision guided munition(s)
SAM โ surface-to-air missile
SEAD โ supression of enemy air defenses
STOL โ short takeoff and landing
STOVL โ short takeoff and vertical landing
TWS โ track while scan, a radar mode which allows radar to provide missile guidance information while still scanning the aerospace for new targets
UAF โ Ukrainian Air Force
UAV โ Unmanned Aerial Vehicle
UCAV โ Unmanned Combat Aerial Vehicle
YGBSM โ You Gotta Be Shitting Me, unofficial motto of the โWild Weaselโ squadrons when told of their new mission as SAM baits
Source: History and War
Direct link to the original article: https://historyandwar.org/2023/01/26/lessons-of-air-war-in-ukraine
Thanks to Pukovnik for this analysis!
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